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Abstract
The present thesis analyzes the impact of the Norwegian inflation targeting regime
on the 2008 financial crisis. A series of macroeconomic indicators are used to
evaluate the usefulness of inflation as a proxy for economic activity.
I find that a combination of rapidly increasing prices in housing and stock
markets, combined with increasing export prices and declining import prices have
led to an exceptionally large gap between pressure in the economy and the inflation
rate. Consequently, the central bank ought to have pursued a tighter monetary
policy, to limit vulnerability to new shocks.
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Preface
The image on the cover shows the engine room telegraph onboard the Royal Navy
cruiser HMS Belfast. The captain could transmit precise orders to the engine room,
confident that these would be followed immediately. My first years of studying
economics felt much the same, it was primarily a subject of precise logic. Models
were better when more bells and whistles were included.
Courses on economic history and financial crises changed my view of economics
radically. Classical economics, Keynesianism, Austrian economics, monetarism
and more recently neo-Keynesianism have all failed to explain key developments.
Increasing complexity and apparent precision does not necessarily improve results
– the models may be asking the wrong questions.
As much as economists like to aim for precise measures and definitive conclu-
sions, monetary policy has consistently failed to be a predictable science. This
thesis reflects both what I have learnt through five years at NHH and what I be-
lieve to be the limits of empirical analysis. Rather than construct a complicated
econometric model answering a narrow question precisely, a wide range of data is
analyzed.
I owe a large debt to my advisor Ola Honningdal Grytten for encouragement,
inspiration, patience and feedback in the writing process. I could not be more
grateful for his support.
Bergen, June 4th 2010
Thomas Rev˚a
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The link between monetary policy and financial crises constitutes a central part
of our understanding of the occurence and management of financial crises. The
deflationary monetary policy of Norges Bank during the 1920s is considered one of
the central causes of the Norwegian financial crisis in that decade (Klovland 1999),
and the expansionary policy of the 1930s is argued to be the key factor in explaining
the modest impact of the Great Depression (Grytten 2006). Similar stories can be
told for other periods and countries (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). This thesis deals
with the impact of the current monetary policy regime on the 2008 financial crisis.
Financial crises have significant impact on the development of the real econ-
omy and economic institutions. The financial turmoil in the interwar period has
received large attention, a review of the Norwegian literature on the field is avail-
able in Hodne and Grytten (2002). The debate concerns both how the economy
functions, and the choice of policies to manage that economy. Caprio and Klinge-
biel (1996) compile a list of bank insolvencies and an estimate of the associated
costs, finding that transfers payments made during the recovery are often in the
region of 10-20 per cent of GDP, with the extreme cases of Chile and Argentina
estimated at 40-55 per cent.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the link between inflation targeting
and economic output from 2000 to 2009. Because inflation is central to monetary
policy, understanding this link can yield potentially valuable information about the
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effects of inflation targeting in general and its contribution to the 2008 financial
crisis in particular.
No open economy has been left unharmed in the current turmoil, so the point
of the exercise is not to seek the single Holy Grail that gives a complete overview
of the crisis. Given the universal impact of the crisis, all guilt can obviously not
be assigned to domestic factors. However, discrepancy between developments in
different countries suggests that differences in the domestic sector have affected
the size of the domestic bubble. Monetary policy is one such factor. Since many
countries follow a inflation targeting policy similar to that in Norway, I also expect
my analysis to be of value in explaining the development in other countries.
This thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 looks at the basics of inflation
targeting – the macroeconomic arguments supporting it, its implementation in
Norway and some potential pitfalls. Chapter 3 summarizes some of the literature
on financial crises, to give an impression of how monetary policy could lead us into
or let us escape from bubbles in financial markets. Chapter 4 provides an overview
of recent economic developments. Chapter 5 analyzes how inflation targeting may
have contributed to a bubble. Finally, conclusions are offered in chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Inflation Targeting – theoretical
grounds and implementation
Managing monetary policy through the explicit statement of an inflationary goal
is a relatively new phenomenon, New Zealand was the first country to introduce
such a policy in 1989 (Bernanke and Mishkin 1997, p. 99). Since then, a large
number of countries have introduced inflation targeting. In this chapter, I present
the logic behind and arguments for inflation targeting, outline the implementation
in Norway and introduce some potentials pitfalls.
2.1 Balancing goals – expectations and stability
The systemic debate – the role of central banks
The role of central banks has been a key question in economics over the past
century. Is the role of monetary policy merely to protect the value of a currency
at a predictable level, or does monetary policy have to do with the real economy?
Klovland (1989, p. 32) summarizes the view on the long run role of monetary
policy, writing “there is overwhelming theoretical and empirical evidence showing
that monetary policy in the long run mainly affects nominal figures in the econ-
omy.” Finding theoretical arguments or empirical support against the neutrality
12
of money in the long run is hard – as long as inflation is kept within reasonably
predictable limits. Monetary policy cannot lead to economic growth in the long
run – such growth is led by the real sector.
Whilst the role of monetary policy in the long run is very limited, much research
has suggested that economic output in the short run is dependent on monetary pol-
icy. Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999, p. 1) write that “a stream of empirical work
beginning in the late 1980s has made the case that monetary policy significantly
influences the short-term course of the real economy.”
As a consequence of this duality between short run impact and long run neu-
trality, monetary policy must be designed to strike a balance between controlling
output in the short term and keeping nominal figures predictable in the long term.1
Constraints and flexibility – keeping options open or being
bound to the mast?
The value of flexibility is a basic fact of life in economics. If a decision can be
postponed without cost, it should always be considered. Having the option to
change our minds at a later stage is usually valuable. In the realm of central
banking, this is not necessarily the case.
In Homer’s Odyssey, the witch-goddess Circe warns Odyssey about the Sirens,
whose seducting voices would leave sailors compelled to shipwreck.
. . . have them tie you hand and foot on the fast ship, standing
upright against the mast with the ropes’ ends lashed around it,
so that you can have joy in hearing the song of the Sirens;
but if you supplicate your men and implore them to set you
free, then they must tie you fast with even more lashings.
(Homer 1991, p. 186)
1In the term “strike a balance”, some kind of tradeoff is implied – this need not be more
complicated than the eternal wish for as high output as possible in the short run, whilst keeping
nominal figures reasonably predictable in the long run.
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Only through being bound to the mast could one live through hearing the song
of the Sirens. Inflation targeting is one case of being bound to the mast.
Keeping options open leaves greater room for speculation, fear and uncertainty
in financial markets – all undesirable characteristics. Thus we are left with one of
the puzzles of monetary policy, the balance between keeping the flexibility to sort
out problems and the need to communicate clearly and convincingly with markets,
in order to establish a nominal anchor.
When evaluating inflation targeting and its consequences, assuming that all
would be well if full discretion were to be given to the monetary authorities would
be an unfair comparison. We need to take into account the possibility of other
policies seducing sailors and central bankers to shipwreck. Inflation has not been
a problem in major western economies in recent years, but there is no guarantee
that things stay that way; past gains should not be taken for granted.
Escaping inflationary bias – the case for inflation targeting
Inflation targeting is one possible way of balancing long and short term goals.
When the monetary policy of a central bank is dictated by inflation targeting, the
central bank aims for a specified inflation target – this may be a single value or a
range. The target is usually stated with some designation of the time frame within
which the target should be reached.
As explained by Kydland and Prescott (1977), governments have incentives to
first communicate that it will pursue a monetary policy leading to low inflation,
then expand the economy once expectations of low inflation have been established.
Escaping this inflationary bias is a key goal of inflation targeting.
A publicly stated inflation target yields clear information to actors in the mar-
ket. For example, during wage negotiations, employees know approximately what
level of inflation to expect. This creates a reasonably secure link between expected
and actual real wages, once agreement on a nominal level has been reached.
Promising low inflation rates does not in itself guarantee escape from the in-
flationary bias. The inflation target has to be credible if markets are to act on it.
How is a target made credible? Plagued with high inflation before the introduc-
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tion of inflation targeting, New Zealand followed an extreme route, and explicitly
stated that the governor of the central bank would be fired if inflation exceeded
a set level (Ga¨rtner 2006, pp. 351-2). This gives the governor a strong incentive
to ignore short-term pleas from interest groups and focus on reaching the inflation
target.
As effective as such an extreme policy might be in meeting the inflation target,
having a central bank governor focusing solely on keeping inflation low might be
a costly exercise; we usually want monetary policy to stabilize macroeconomic
fluctuations as well. Introducing a formal target as part of the central bank’s
mandate, even without any clear consequences set if the target is not reached,
might also have a positive effect on escaping a high-inflation environment. The
argument for this can take several forms, one of them is that the inflation target
is a way of communicating with markets and politicians.
Bernanke (2003) has argued that introducing a formal target increases the
central bank’s independence from external pressure. For example, it is hard for
politicians to argue against a central banker when a tight economic policy is needed
to lower inflation towards the targets set by the same politicians.
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy
Monetary policy influences the real economy through the transmission mechanism.
Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (2001) provides an overview of this
mechanism. Figure 2.1 summarizes the channels through which monetary policy
works.
The interest rate channel is the primary mechanism in many macroeconomic
models. The basic idea is simple – given some degree of sticky prices, increased
nominal interest rates increase the real interest rates and hence the user cost of
capital. This change leads to postponement of consumption or reduced invest-
ments, and consequently reduced economic activity. In figure 2.1, this channel is
represented by the official and market rates.
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) describe how the macroeconomic response to in-
terest rate changes is larger than that suggested by estimated interest elasticities
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Figure 2.1: A summary of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Source:
Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (2001).
of consumption and investment. This suggests that other channels also have an
impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy.
The wealth channel can bridge part of the gap. This channel originates in the
thinking of Ando and Modigliani (1963). They describe a life-cycle model where
the wealth of a household is a key component in their spending decisions because
the household wishes to maintain an even consumption path over time. Monetary
policy affects wealth through asset prices – increasing interest rates reduces the
net present value of long-lived assets.
Asset prices further determine the value of collateral presented when obtaining
loans. In an idealized credit market without friction, this change in collateral value
should not change investment or consumption decisions. However, when agency
costs and imperfect information play a significant role, declining collateral values
will increase the risk premium for borrowers. Kuttner and Mosser (2002, p. 17)
label this as the “financial accelerator effect”.
One simple way of illustrating this effect is the model used by Hall (2001) to
describe the external finance premium. This model postulates that investors prefer
internal financing because external financing involves informational asymmetries
and agency problems, and consequently comes at a higher cost. Reduced collateral
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values increase this premium.
The model is illustrated in figure 2.2. Initially, the interest rate is at level r1,
and an investor has F amount of internal funds available. Demand for funding
is given by the demand curve D, supply is initially s1. The agency costs lead
investors to investment level I ′1 because they will have to pay a premium of r
′
1− r1
to compensate lenders for the asymmetries, lowering investment from I1 which
would have been the equilibrium if no agency costs were present.
Cost of funds
Interest-sensitive 
spending
D
s1
r1
r2
s2
r1’
r2’
F I1I2’ I1’
Figure 2.2: Interest rate changes and the marginal cost of finance.
Imagine that the interest rate in a market without asymmetries2 increases from
r1 to r2. The increased funding cost for internally funded investments is simply the
change in interest r2 − r1. If collateral is provided to reduce the agency costs for
the external financing, the value of this collateral is likely to have been reduced as
a consequence of the interest rate change. This can make the premium on external
financing higher – thus increasing the gradient of s2, the supply curve for external
financing. This is the essence of the financial accelerator effect.
2The interest rates r1 and r2 are not meant to be risk free interest rates – after all, the internal
funds may be lost if the firm goes bankrupt, so there is a very real element of risk in these rates.
The rates r1 and r2 take into account the operational risk, not the risks associated with agency
costs.
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Monetary policy influences expectations and confidence. For example, an in-
crease in interest rate by the central bank may be interpreted as a sign that the
central bank has revised its growth estimates upwards, giving cause for optimism in
the economy. Alternatively, the same interest rate change might be seen as taking
action to limit inflation. Consequently, we cannot determine any fixed relationship
between monetary policy and expectations, but we know that this channel may
have a role. Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (2001) emphasize how
this makes the effect of monetary policy decisions very uncertain, and increases
the need for clear communication from the central bank.
Exchange rates are closely related to monetary policy. The links are many and
complex – expectations play an important role – but in general an unexpected
rise in interest rates would cause an appreciation of domestic currency, because
domestic assets become more attractive to foreign investors. Bank of England
Monetary Policy Committee (2001, pp. 4-6) write that “the exchange rate should
move to a level where investors expect a future depreciation just large enough to
make them indifferent between holding sterling and foreign-currency assets.”
2.2 Implementation in Norway
Legal mandate
The Norwegian inflation targeting is formalized in the “Regulation on Monetary
Policy” established by Royal Decree 29 March 2001. This decree states that “The
operational target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of
approximately 2.5 per cent over time”, thus laying the foundation for the Norwe-
gian inflation targeting policy.
It is interesting to note that whilst the Decree specifies inflation as the opera-
tional target of the bank, other macroeconomic variables should also be taken into
account when making decisions on the monetary policy;
Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s
national and international value, contributing to stable expectations
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concerning exchange rate developments. At the same time, monetary
policy shall underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable develop-
ments in output and employment.
A key point here is that Norges Bank is very explicit in stating that both infla-
tion and real variables are part of its target. These targets are not intended as
competing goals that need to be balance, rather “the first indicates the situation
that should eventually be reached (. . . ), while the second describes the type of
transition path by which it should be reached” (Woodford 2007, p. 11).
As a consequence, the legal mandate implies a theory of the connection be-
tween inflation and ouput; through steering inflation towards the 2.5% goal in the
medium term, it is believed that major output gaps can also be avoided.
Time horizons and loss functions – is inflation targeting a fixed rule?
The Royal Decree states that inflation should reach 2.5% over time – what exactly
is meant by “over time”? To be more precise: how long time does the central
bank have to reach its target? The answer to this question contains important
information about the interpretation of the mandate – what is the optimal balance
of deviations from target of output and inflation?
In the introduction to the Monetary Policy Reports (and the Inflation Report,
its predecessor), Norges Bank provides an interpretation of its mandate. The time
horizon for reaching the inflation target is specified, which is of particular interest
here.
Table 2.1 shows how the central bank has changed its interpretation of the
time horizon. Over time, the time horizon has grown and the bank seems less
preoccupied with reaching the exact target. There are two natural interpretations
of this – either the central bank has become less concerned with reaching the
inflation target, or a wider range of policies can be introduced without jeopardizing
the expectations of low inflation once the central bank’s commitment to the target
has become credible. The truth is likely some combination of the two.
The central bank’s view of the time horizon may be seen as part of the estima-
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Table 2.1: Time horizon in Norges Bank’s communication. Sources: Norges Bank
(2001, 2002, 2004, 2007) and Gjedrem (2009).
Time Description of time horizon
2001 ... at the target in two years ...
2002 ... normally at the target in two years [my emph.]
2004 ... at the target within a reasonable time horizon, nor-
mally 1-3 years.
2007 ... near the goal in the medium term ...
2009 ... we should probably have a fairly long time horizon,
so that any output shocks may be accommodated ...
tion of a loss function the central bank minimizes, commonly stated as3
Lt =
1
2
[(pit − pi∗)2 + λ(yt − y∗t )2] (2.1)
where (pit − pi∗)2 is the squared deviation between the current inflation and the
inflation target, (yt − y∗t )2 is the squared difference between current and potential
output, λ is a parameter weighing the relative “cost of deviations” for the central
bank.
In more intuitive terms, the loss function is a mathematical approximation of
the mandate of central banks, specifying that the banks should avoid deviations
both from potential output and the inflation target.
The λ parameter specifies the optimal tradeoff between inflation and output
deviation. The extreme case of λ = 0 would imply that only deviations from
the inflation target should be given weight – ignoring all output deviation. When
λ > 0, some weight is given to the output gap, usually called flexible inflation
targeting. A higher λ can then be interpreted as a sign that the time horizon for
reaching the inflation target is longer – and vice versa.
Thus, with the language of the central bank indicating a longer time horizon
and reduced “precision”, it seems that λ has grown over time; the bank focuses
more on stabilizing output and less on reaching the inflation target quickly.
3See e.g. Røisland and Sveen (2006, p. 20)
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Reduced focus on inflation is interesting as a way of understanding monetary
policy. Perhaps at least as important, it is also an indication of the degrees of
freedom the central bank has even when an inflation targeting “rule” has been
established. Inflation targeting does not involve replacing economic judgment with
an automated process.
Measuring inflation
The legal mandate of Norges Bank specifies that the relevant price index for in-
flation targeting is the consumer price inflation. This section describes the main
indices used in measuring inflation, and outlines how these are calculated. All
three measures are used by Norges Bank, see e.g. Monetary Policy Report (Norges
Bank 2010b). This section also contains a description of how the cost of housing
is included in the inflation indices.
The Consumer Price Index from Statistics Norway – the CPI
The basic measure of inflation in Norway is the the Consumer Price Index (CPI),
an index prepared by Statistics Norway.
The index is calculated through collecting prices of a wide range of goods and
services in Norway. These prices are then weighed according to their share of
consumption as measured by an annual household survey. The aim of the index is
to measure the cost of living, as modeled by the cost of consuming a fixed basket
of goods.
The index is used in a large number of public and private bodies for a wide
variety of purposes, so it is prepared not only to facilitate monetary policy man-
agement (Johannessen and Sandberg 2004). This limits the extent to which the
inflation measurement can be fine-tuned to match the specific needs of the central
bank.
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Inflation without energy and tax changes – CPI-ATE
The mandate of the central bank specifies that changes in the inflation caused
by “changes in interest rates, taxes, duties and idiosyncratic, temporary shocks”
should not be taken into account. To adjust for this, Statistics Norway prepares an
index that excludes energy products and is adjusted for tax changes, the CPI-ATE.
Excluding energy prices reduces the sensitivity of the index to price shocks, so
that the measured inflation is insensitive to “idiosyncratic and temporary shocks”.
It can be argued that an increase in energy prices such as the 1973 OPEC shock
should not require a tight monetary policy to limit inflation if a large part of that
inflation is caused by the sudden spike in oil prices.
Including energy price trends, not shocks – CPIXE
Nordbø (2008) describes how energy prices over a period from the late 1990s to
2008 had grown faster than other prices, thus causing the CPI-ATE to undervalue
the underlying inflation. The salient point is that the CPI-ATE excludes all energy
prices, not only the temporary shocks the central bank is mandated to exclude from
its target.
Because of this omission, Norges Bank has developed a third measure of infla-
tion, CPIXE (Nordbø 2008). This measure is a combination of the CPI-ATE and
an estimated trend growth in energy prices. The measured rate of inflation should
then be closer to the true increase in cost of living than what has been the case
when energy prices have been excluded.
Housing prices
The prices of most goods can be monitored either through electronic collection of
data or through physically checking prices periodically. Inflation measures should
ideally show the increase in nominal income required to keep utility constant.
When monitoring prices periodically, it is thus assumed that the utility from a
good is obtained at the time of purchase.
It is not the act of buying a house that yields utility. Home ownership is
22
modeled as an investment in housing capital that yields a stream of services over
time (Johannessen and Sandberg 2004). It is this stream of housing services that
yields utility. However, the market value of this stream is not observable.
There are two main approaches to solving this problem: estimate user prices
or use rental costs. Statistics Norway uses the latter approach when preparing the
inflation indices, consistent with the consensus among statisticians (Johannessen
and Sandberg 2004).
If rental costs do not have the same price determinants as rents, this could cause
a deviation between estimated and actual cost of housing services. In 2001, 23% of
norwegian households rented their accommodation. 58.8% of households with the
oldest member younger than 24 was renting their home, 13.8% of households where
the oldest member is between 45 and 49 rent their accommodation (Statistics
Norway 2002). These figures illustrate both the prevalence of owner-occupied
dwellings and how the rental market is skewed towards the low end of the market.
The main alternative approach is to estimate user prices. This involves deduct-
ing interest rate and upkeep costs from capital gains made on sale. This technique
requires that equilibrium is reached in all markets, and that the savings rate is
constant (Johannessen and Sandberg 2004). If user prices are used, this will lead
to large changes in estimated housing costs when interest rates or home prices
change.
“Reaching equilibrium in all markets” might sound like a standard economics
assumption without any major implications. However, in the housing market,
there are likely to be major deviations from this idealized market. The assumption
really implies that all households should adjust their investment in the housing
market with changing prices or interest rate. Both the financial and non-financial
costs associated with moving are large, and a major limitation to flexibility in the
housing market.
Both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses, no theoretically correct
option exists, so the choice must rely on empirical investigations. Inflation mea-
sures are used for a wide variety of purposes, and Statistics Norway are very clear
in communicating that rental costs are used because they provide the best approx-
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imation of housing costs – not that their choice necessarily is the optimal for use
in inflation targeting (Johannessen and Sandberg 2004).
2.3 Pitfalls – inflation and output
This section introduces three studies relevant to inflation targeting, and discusses
how their conclusions might affect the execution of monetary policy under an in-
flation targeting regime. First, the historical link between inflation and output
is analyzed. I then summarize a study describing a method for constructing a
“stability price index” – a measure of inflation intended to minimize macroeco-
nomic fluctuations. Finally, a summary of Borio and Lowe (2002) illustrates how
an inflation targeting policy might contribute to the creation of bubbles.
Empirical estimates of output and inflation
Grytten and Hunnes (2009) analyze the link between short term output changes
and price fluctuations for Norway over the period 1830-2006. A key assumption
in Keynesian economics is that there is a positive correlation between output and
prices in the short term. In the Norwegian inflation targeting regime, this assump-
tion is the basis for the link between keeping inflation low and output deviations
small. In other words, Keynesian economics implies that inflation targeting will
generally be counter-cyclical, in that high inflation is correlated with a positive
output gap.
Most economists agree that the economy is led by the supply-side in the long
run, where output depends on production possibilities. With this approach, output
can be described by a production function stating that output is a result of capital
C, labour L and natural resources N . A residual factor ε normally denoted total
factor productivity.4
Y = F (C,L,N) + ε (2.2)
4This model presented here is described in Grytten and Hunnes (2009).
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In the short run, Keynesian economics assumes that output moves within the
limits of production barriers in the economy. Consequently, output fluctuations
in the short term reflect how the production possibilities are utilized. Keynesian
theory postulates that the degree of utilization depends on the demand side of the
economy, implying that output is a function of demand,
Y = F (D) (2.3)
Production possibilities are fixed in the short run, so it is assumed that positive
shifts in the demand curve lead to increases in price. This makes the price level P
a function of demand,
P = F (D) (2.4)
In Keynesian theory, demand is made up of consumption C, investment I,
government expenditures G and net exports X −M .
D = C + I +G+X −M (2.5)
Thus, price movements dP can be estimated as a function of GDP movements
dY . This is the main relationship estimated by Grytten and Hunnes (2009).
dP = F ( dY ) (2.6)
Grytten and Hunnes (2009) find that there is no clear positive correlation
between inflation and output. Contrary to the assumptions behind Keynesianism,
they find evidence of a negative relationship in the short run, suggesting that most
business cycles are caused by supply-side factors rather than demand-side shocks.
They do however find that negative demand shocks often cause a lagged negative
price response, suggesting that demand-side factors are critical in some business
cycles.
In other words, the Keynesian assumption about the relationship between out-
put and inflation is found to be wrong in most periods, while it exists in others
– notably where there is clear evidence of a negative demand-side shock. Nega-
tive demand shocks are key to Keynesian economics, and one interpretation of the
result is that the conclusions from Keynesian models should not be uncritically
applied in all periods, though they can provide valuable insight in some periods.
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Significance for inflation targeting
In inflation targeting, the link between short-term output fluctuations and inflation
is critical. Monetary policy targets an inflation rate, and the real economic impact
of this targeting depends on the link between inflation and output.
In periods with demand-side shocks, the results from Grytten and Hunnes
(2009) suggest that the correlation between inflation and output is positive, hence
moving the economy towards the inflation target would presumably also move the
economy towards its production possibility frontier. Inflation targeting then has
a counter-cyclical effect – positive output gaps are correlated with high inflation,
which calls for a tight monetary policy, and vice versa.
The case is different in periods where development in the economy is led by
the supply-side. The counter-cyclical nature of inflation targeting applies only
when there is a positive link between inflation and output. When and where the
link between inflation and output is negative, the consequences of strict inflation
targeting might be a pro-cyclical monetary policy. To avoid such policies and limit
macroeconomic instability, alternative approaches to inflation targeting might be
worthwhile, either through using alternative approaches for measuring the output
gap or through using a different measure of inflation. We now turn to one such
measure of inflation.
Are all sectors created equal? Constructing an economically
optimal measure of inflation
Mankiw and Reis (2003) ask what inflation measure central banks should choose to
maximize economic stability. Their departure point is that measures of the overall
price level have been studied extensively from a statistical standpoint, but little
formal work has been done to establish a measure optimal from a macroeconomic
standpoint.
A fairly large amount of attention has been devoted to some questions concern-
ing the optimal inflation measure. Mankiw and Reis (2003) mention two examples.
Some economists choose to focus on “core inflation” excluding some volatile prices
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such as oil prices, whilst others argue that these volatile prices “are particularly
good indicators because they are highly responsive to changing economic condi-
tions” (Mankiw and Reis 2003, p. 1). Asset prices have also been central to
the discussion, with some economists arguing that they prices should be included
because of the information these prices contain.
With these discussions as their basis, Mankiw and Reis (2003) create an opti-
mization model where the goal of the central bank is to maximize macroeconomic
stability through changing the weight applied to different sectors in the price index.
Their empirical starting point is that
1. sectors differ in their budget share
2. some sectors have more cyclical prices than others
3. some sectors have large idiosyncratic shocks
4. the degree of price flexibility differs between sectors
Mankiw and Reis (2003) formalize these observations as
p∗k = p+ αkx− εk (2.7)
Where p∗k is the equilibrium price in sector k, p the conventional measurement
of the price level (e.g. as measured in the standard inflation measures), αk the
sensitivity of sector k’s equilibrium price to the business cycle, x the output gap
and εk an idiosyncratic shock with standard deviation σ
2
k. In other words, it is
postulated that the equilibrium price in a sector depends on “the state of the
business cycle and some other shock” (Mankiw and Reis 2003, p. 3.)
The inflation is measured as
p =
K∑
k=1
θkpk (2.8)
with K sectors and θk as the weight assigned to each sector.
The degree of price stickiness in a sector is modeled in Mankiw and Reis (2003)
by assuming that a fraction λk of prices in a sector are based on updated informa-
tion, and a fraction 1− λk is based on expectations E(p∗k). This implies that the
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price p in sector k can be shown as
pk = λkp
∗
k + (1− λk)E(p∗k) (2.9)
The smaller λk is, the less the sector responses to news about equilibrium prices.
Conversely, as λk approaches 1, the price in a sector is assumed to be perfectly
flexible.
Inflation targeting implies a wish to keep the weighed average of sector prices
at a given level, Mankiw and Reis (2003) sets this to 0 – non-zero values would
not change the conclusion. We can then write the central bank goal as
K∑
k=1
wkpk = 0 (2.10)
For a set of weights wk that satisfy
K∑
k=1
wk = 1 (2.11)
We now have target weighs wk and consumption weights θk. The target weights
wk is modeled as a decision variable of the central bank in a simple optimization
problem.
The goal of the central bank is assumed to be maximization of macroeconomic
stability – in other words, to minimize the variation in output x. The central
choice is then to choose a set of weights wk that achieve this goal, given the
sectoral characteristics described.
Putting this together, we have:
min V ar(x) (2.12)
by changing
wk
subject to
K∑
k=1
wkpk = 0
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K∑
k=1
wk = 1
pk = λkp
∗
k + (1− λk)E(p∗k)
p∗k = p+ αkx− εk
p =
K∑
k=1
θkpk
Thus, the central bank chooses weights wk in its stability price index so that
volatility in the output gap is minimized, given the constraints in the economy.
Mankiw and Reis (2003) specify this model for the U.S. economy with a simple
model with four sectors. The weights θk and optimized weights wk for these sectors
is shown in table 2.2.
Table 2.2: U.S. weights in consumption and optimized indices. Source: Mankiw
and Reis (2003).
Sector θk wk
Energy 0.07 0.10
Food 0.15 0.37
Other goods 0.78 -0.73
Nominal wages 0 1.26
It is particularly interesting to note that nominal wages seems to provide sig-
nificant value to the model. Wages are of course not included in the regular price
index. It is also worth noting that “other goods” are given a large negative weight
in the optimal index. This result is dependent upon the pattern of correlations
between shocks in different sectors (Mankiw and Reis 2003, p. 18).
Mankiw and Reis (2003) are very clear that their results are preliminary, and
that the index they create is nowhere near ready for implementation. What seems
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to be clear from the results, however, is that a central bank wanting to minimize
variations in the output gap might need to focus on a different price index than
the general consumer price index. Inflation targeting does not automatically lead
to a counter-cyclical monetary policy, and the relationship between inflation and
output depends on the sectors in the economy. Thus, increased prices in one sector
might be a sign that the central bank should enact a tight monetary policy, whilst
the same change in prices for another sector is likely to represent an idiosyncratic
shock.
Will excess demand cause inflation with a credible inflation
targeting policy?
Borio and Lowe (2002) analyze the potential for occurence of bubbles in a low-
inflation environment. When an inflation targeting regime has anchored expecta-
tions, the degree of price stickiness in wages and prices may be increased. This
stickiness can increase the time it takes for increased aggregate demand to show
up in the form of inflation.
If aggregate demand can increase significantly without causing inflation in the
short term, this reduces the “visible” need for central banks to respond with tighter
monetary policy, since the inflation target is not under pressure.
Inflation targeting can reduce the pro-cyclical tendency found in exchange rate
regimes and consequently stabilize the economy.5 However, when cases with excess
demand do not lead to inflation because of price stickiness, and the stable prices
signal to the central bank that all is well, inflation targeting might actually lead
to increased financial instability.
Borio and Lowe (2002) suggest that rapid credit expansion and above-average
capital accumulation are areas where excess aggregate demand is likely to show
up when price stickiness leads to low inflation. To explain these tendencies and
understand how bubbles can be spotted, we turn to the next topic of this thesis –
5The simplest way of illustrating this pro-cyclical nature of fixed-rate regimes is to consider
the gold standard – a current account deficit causes an outflow of gold, this outflow leads the
central bank to reduce the money supply.
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the theories of financial bubbles and crises.
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Chapter 3
Financial bubbles and crises –
theories and frameworks
The link between financial bubbles and crises is neither obvious nor simple. This
chapter presents a few of the models postulating how these situations are linked.
The aim is to create a mental framework for making sense of the many details
involved in both bubbles and crises, hopefully useful in creating a coherent image
of the situation when delving into details.
3.1 A theory of bubbles
Bubbles in financial markets are often described as speculative, implying that some
agents stipulate that developments in the market place will give them a return on
their investments, even if the fundamental economics of an instrument do not
support such high prices.
The bubble can then be expressed in a simple equation1, defining the value of
a bubble bt as a function of the expectations E of the future value of the bubble
bt+1, discounted by a cost of capital r. This is expressed in equation 3.1 – current
deviation from fundamental value is the discounted future deviation.
bt = (
1
1 + r
)Et(bt+1) (3.1)
1The model described here is found in Grytten (2009).
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Equilibrium in a financial market can be expressed as a state where the current
price p is the discounted sum of expected dividends and the future price:
pt = (
1
1 + r
)Et(dt+1 + pt+1) (3.2)
Over time, the price of an financial asset will be the net present value of all
future dividends over the holding period plus the discounted value of the expected
future price at the time of sale.
pt =
n∑
j=1
(
1
1 + r
)jEt(dt+j) + (
1
1 + r
)nEt(pt+n) (3.3)
This gives a net present value of the financial object as
pt =
∞∑
j=1
(
1
1 + r
)jEt(dt+j) + bt (3.4)
Where bt is a stochastic process satisfying equation 3.1. Finding the value of the
bubble is then simply a case of rearranging the expression:
bt = pt −
∞∑
j=1
(
1
1 + r
)jEt(dt+j) (3.5)
That is, the bubble value is equal to the market price minus the fundamental
value – the latter being defined as the discounted value of all future dividends from
the asset.
The intuitive interpretation of this is that market prices can deviate from their
long-term fundamental values. In a speculative market, investors buy an asset
today expecting to sell with a profit at time t + 1 – even if fundamentals do not
support such pricing. Investment decisions are not as simple as described in some
introductory finance textbooks – estimates are merely indicative, and measurement
errors are unknown, but often large.
This formal definition is worth keeping in mind when looking at the frameworks
aiming to explain how financial crises develop. The essence of their aim is to
explain how such bubbles can occur and the problems associated with unwinding
them.
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3.2 Kindleberger and Minsky – frameworks and
models
Hyman Minsky’s model of monetary crises
Hyman Minsky (1919-1996) developed a model of financial crises in five stages
(Kindleberger and Aliber 2005, p. 21–30). This model is largely a theoretical one,
with little reference to empirical data. It aims to explain how a financial bubble
can occur, and then the path to a market crash and subsequent financial crisis.
The model is deterministic; once the economy is on the path towards a bubble,
averting the coming crisis is impossible (Grytten 2008b).
The stages of Minsky’s model are summarized in figure 3.1. I will now explain
each of these stages in more detail, using AD–AS (Aggregated Demand-Aggregated
Supply) and IS–LM (Investments and Savings–Liquidity preference Money supply)
models.
Displacement
The initial stage of the model is a displacement. This displacement is an exogenous
macroeconomic shock changing expectations about the future development of the
economy(Grytten 2008b). Displacements can come in many shapes and could for
example be opened trade routes, a new technology or a financial innovation. New
financial instruments such as collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and credit de-
fault swaps (CDS) are potential culprits with the current crisis in mind. Credit
default swaps were supposed to remove the risk involved with potential lenders not
paying back their loans. Through separating out this risk, markets were perceived
to be more efficient at measuring and managing risk, thus supporting diversifica-
tion through the creation of CDOs. This increased diversification and perceived
improvement in risk management supported higher asset prices.
A positive macroeconomic shock shifts the IS curve outwards. This increases
the interest rate and economic activity. The higher interest rate increases demand
for domestic currency. Governments often want to avoid appreciation of the cur-
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Figure 3.1: A summary of Minsky’s model
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rency, and would therefore increase the money supply to counter the increased
demand.2 This increased money supply represents an outward shift in the LM
curve. The total effect is then lowered interest rate and increased output. Lower
interest rates encourage investment. The AD curve shifts outwards.
Overtrading
After expectations have been altered in the displacement phase, the economy
moves to the next phase, overtrading(Kindleberger and Aliber 2005, p. 25). It is
argued that the impact of the positive shock is overestimated, resulting in incorrect
profit estimates. With the CDS example above, this could simply imply that the
benefit of separating the credit default risk was overestimated, thus putting too
high a value on the securities and too low a cost on insuring the debt. Estimated
profits higher than actual will result in values that are higher than those supported
by underlying economic realities – and a bubble is created.
In figure 3.2, overtrading is explained in an AS–AD model. Speculation in-
creases demand for goods and financial assets. After some time, demand exceeds
supply, and prices rise. This increases the potential profit, and attracts new in-
vestors. Those usually outside the markets see the opportunity for a quick profit,
and are tempted to enter. Market prices start to deviate from fundamental values,
creating the positive bubble.
The element of speculation implies that investments are made with a plan
to sell them, rather than to consume goods or get income from an investment.
Speculators have a role in all markets by trying to find an equilibrium, but when
longer-term growth in a market is driven by pure speculation, there is more cause
for concern.
2Even if inflation targeting has abandoned the automatic accelerators of fixed exchange rate
regimes, the exchange rate remains significant for monetary policy, both as a factor in inflation
through imported goods and the output gap.
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Monetary expansion
The next stage in the model is monetary expansion. There is an element of path
dependency in this phase, when asset prices increase in the overtrading phase,
an expectation of continued increase in prices occur. This expectation makes
lending money to invest an attractive proposition – even if the underlying profit
expectations do not support the current price level. In addition, as Kindleberger
and Aliber (2005, p. 22) outlines, “both the lenders’ assessments of the risk of
individual investments and their risk averseness decline.” In other words, there is
a pro-cyclical element in the assessment of risk. This increases the money supply.
The increased money supply represents an outward shift of the LM curve,
shown in figure 3.3. This increases access to liquidity, pushing interest rates down
and further increasing output. The AD curve shifts outwards yet again, leading
to higher output and inflation.
Revulsion
The next phase is revulsion where the seemingly endless increase in prices stop.
Investors start to realize that buying an asset today with a plan of selling it at
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Figure 3.3: Monetary expansion (IS–LM)
a higher price at time t + 1 is not a fool-proof plan of action (Grytten 2008b).
Consequently, the queue of investors eager to buy today expecting a higher price
tomorrow disappears – leading to falling market prices.
The reduced willingness to finance investments through borrowing reduces the
money supply, shifting the LM curve to the left, as shown in figure 3.4.
The new investment paradigm of falling asset prices reduces willingness to
invest and consequently demand, shifting the AD curve inwards, as shown in figure
3.5. This leads to falling output and inflation.
Discredit
The fifth and final stage of Minsky’s model is discredit, in which prices fall be-
low their “natural level”. Falling prices leads investors to expect continued de-
cline, thus leading investors to sell assets expecting the prices to fall further
(Kindleberger and Aliber 2005, p. 28). Another case of path dependency occurs
when a large number of investors want to exit the market because of the expected
fall. Investors sell because they expect prices to fall, and prices fall because of the
large number of investors eager to sell. In this stage, the price will move below the
“rational” level, there is a “negative bubble”.
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Discredit is when the financial crisis occurs – investments that “should have
been made” in normal markets are being postponed or cancelled, since even firms
that have attractive investment propositions are unable to secure financing.How
falling asset prices affects the real economy is of course not constant over time nor
between sectors or countries.
Charles Kindleberger and the lender of last resort
Charles Kindleberger (1911-2003) developed a theory based on Minsky’s model
of crises. This theory is less deterministic than Minsky’s model, and does not
have the same rather dogmatic phases (Grytten 2008a). Where Minsky sees the
occurence of a financial crisis as unavoidable once the initial displacement has
taken place, Kindleberger focuses on how a hegemonial power can act as a market
leader and lender of last resort to avoid the crisis. One of his key conclusions
is that the financial sector must be monitored and regulated, and cannot be left
untouched by regulatory authorities (Kindleberger and Aliber 2005, p. 253–5).
As opposed to Minsky’s theoretical foundations, Kindleberger has a much more
empirical focus – not unexpected given that he was a prominent economic historian.
Kindleberger categorizes the development in different periods rather than dividing
the development into separate stages.
The first period, monetary expansion, includes the displacement from Minsky’s
model. An expansion of money supply takes effect through the expected continued
rise of prices. This does not require any change in monetary policy, given how
credit can expand through increased willingness to invest and lend combined with
decreased risk aversion (Grytten 2008a).
Kindleberger calls his second period swindles. As the name implies, question-
able or directly illegal tactics are being used to prop up expectations and profits;
legendary examples of this include Enron and Tyco. One curious example in the re-
cent U.S. subprime-boom is the provision of mortgages to “ninjas – [people with]
no income, no job, no assets” (Hill and Lucas 2009) – where the bank lending
money does not verify whether the lender actually has an income or any assets.
This is of course little more than an invitation from the banks to let their cus-
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tomers lie. Given that the firm providing the mortgage would rarely end up with
the default risk, the issuing bank could thus increase volumes and secure additional
short-term profit.
Management compensation has been linked to short-term profits rather than
the long-term viability of a strategy, giving incentives to propping up short-term
profits regardless of the real risk associated with the loans made by banks. Sys-
temic risks have largely been guaranteed by governments, further contributing to
a situation where short-term gains are privatized and long-term losses socialized.
These are all examples of the wider meaning of swindles.
The critical phase comes next in Kindleberger’s theory. The name of this
period carries a significant meaning. It points to Kindleberger’s less deterministic
view which opens for the possibility of limiting the negative effects of a crisis.
A revulsion in which the markets turn may be part of this period (Kindleberger
and Aliber 2005, p. 77). Whether a bursting bubble ends up in a full-fledged
financial crisis will depend on the policy responses of governments and international
organizations. If a temporary liquidity problem is about to lead markets into a
revulsion, a swift response from governments could hinder this development.
In the critical phase, Kindleberger focuses on the role of the market leader which
has the power to hinder the dissemination of the crisis or limit its effects. This
leader should according to Kindleberger act as a lender of last resort by supplying
both short and long term credit at reasonable rates, maintain an open market for
distressed goods, ensure exchange rate stability and coordinate macroeconomic
policy between governments.
Depending on the cause of the crisis and how it has developed, many different
institutions might be called upon to act as lender of last resort. It could often
be the central bank of a single country or international institutions such as the
IMF. In other cases, market regulators such as the Financial Supervisory Authority
could play a role in averting a crisis – some have for example argued that the ban
on shorting financial stocks during the autumn of 2008 limited further collapses of
financial institutions.
These examples are included to illustrate the lack of generality in Kindle-
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berger’s theory – few conclusions are set in stone, and careful judgments have to
be made when analyzing the development of crises. It could be argued that this re-
flects the difference in approaches between economists and historians. Economists
often view the laws of economics to be constant, historians search for the charac-
teristics that make an event unique.
Failing to hinder a crisis, the next period is described as a domestic propagation
of the crisis. “Domestic” here can have the natural meaning of within a country’s
borders, or it could mean that the crisis spreads within a specific market or sector.
The final period, international propagation, occurs if problems in some regional
or sectoral markets spread to the rest of the economy.
3.3 Barry Eichengreen and elusive stability
In his book Elusive Stability: Essays in the History of International Finance, 1919-
1939, Barry Eichengreen presents an alternative theory of financial crises. Rather
than trying to summarize one common path for all crises, he views financial crises
as a result of distorted equilibria leading to unstable markets.3 Eichengreen’s main
focus has been empirical investigation of the interwar period.
One example of an elusive stability is the fragile international financial system
in the 1920s. Germany paid large war reparations to the allied states, France and
Great Britain paid back loans made by the US during the World War I. Germany’s
war reparations were to a large extent financed through short-term private lending
from US banks – a connection that was not stable and would eventually lead to
chaos when it broke down.
Eichengreen presents a theory explaining how the financial sector might lead
an economy to a temporary equilibrium outside of the fundamental, long-term
equilibrium (Grytten 2008c). These temporary equilibria obscure the underlying
imbalances, leading to a mismatch in financial markets.
Eichengreen postulates that such imbalances can occur because of deficiencies
3The synthesized presentation here borrows heavily from Ola Grytten’s lecture notes for the
course FIE431 – Panics and crashes, Autumn 2008 (Grytten 2008c).
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in macroeconomic coordination – this could for example be between fiscal and
monetary policies or coordination between central banks. Regimes in monetary
policy are in his view central to the development of financial crises, explaining the
breakdown, correction processes and establishment of new regimes.
False equilibria lead to situations where actors in the financial markets base
their decisions on incorrect assumptions. If future profits have been over-estimated
this can initiate situations such as credit-financed bubbles. As time passes, in-
vestors realize that the optimistic profit estimates were unrealistic and markets
adjust from the false equilibrium to the newly discovered long-term equilibrium.
This adjustment process is analogous to the dismantling of the bubble in the earlier
models, and prone to be costly.
Eichengreen’s thesis is that economic growth and financial crises are not merely
the result of supply-side changes, but also depend on a balanced, stable and coor-
dinated monetary policy. International financial crises are, according to his view,
frequently initiated by fixed-rate currency regimes. Coordination and consistency
between central agents is necessary to avoid and limit the impact of crises.
3.4 Identifying bubbles through deviations from
trend
Having reviewed some theories behind financial crises, it is clear that identifying
bubbles as they build up can be of significant value. However, it is equally clear
that this discovery is no simple matter – had the existence of a bubble been obvious
to all it would not have occurred in the first place. This section presents a strategy
for discovering bubbles as they develop.
It is frequently believed that there exists some kind of trend in economic data.
GDP has for example grown over time and the tendency to grow constitutes a
trend. Stock prices also grow over time, but with a much larger volatility.
Establishing deviations from trend might then be one way of finding and burst-
ing bubbles. We might for example estimate that stock prices grow at 10% per
year over time and look for explanations for the deviation if the growth differs
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much from this estimated trend. The large volatility of stock prices implies that
deviations would have to be very large to constitute a significant departure from
the trend. Even if the deviation is large, there might be fundamental reasons for
the break from the trend.
The HP filter
One approach to finding a trend is to filter the value of a time series through the
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. This filter creates a smoothened non-linear repre-
sentation of a time series, making it more sensitive to long-term than short-term
fluctuations.
The time series yt is made up of a trend component τ and a cyclical component
c satisfying yt = ct + τt. Given a positive λ, there is a trend component τ that
will minimize the function
min
T∑
t=1
(yt − τt)2 + λ
T−1∑
t=2
[(τt+1 − τt)− (τt − τt−1)]2 (3.6)
Equation 3.6 is less complicated than it looks – it merely says that a trend can
be found through minimizing the squared distances between actual output and
the trend component, with λ specifying how sensitive the filter should be. With
λ = 0, there will be no filtering; with a very high value for λ, the trend will change
very little over time.
Deciding a value for λ involves a degree of judgment – there is no simple way of
deciding which values are right. The choice of λ decides the degree of smoothing
which should depend on the true trend in the underlying data. Consequently,
the smoothing parameter ought to be chosen with care and the data set in mind.
Standard values for λ are 100 for annual data, 1600 for quarterly data and 14400
for monthly data (Ravn and Uhlig 2002).
Weak theoretical grounding. The HP filter has a limited theoretical ground-
ing. We are simply assuming that the filtered series constitutes a trend and that
this trend represents fundamental values. The results we get are highly dependent
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on the λ chosen, and there is little theoretical basis for choosing a λ value, beyond
finding one that is “suitable”.4
The end-point problem. Bernhardsen, Eitrheim, Jore and Røisland (2004)
discuss the end-point problem in the HP filter. The weights change as we move
from the middle of a time series to its ends – we only have data for one side of the
point of time in question. This can be accommodated to some extent by extending
the time series further back at the start of the period.
The only possible workaround at the end of a time series with recent data is to
extend the series through creating some kind of forecast. If our goal is to discover
whether a bubble exists, there is of course little use in making such forecasts. This
would involve either assuming that the current trend continues or assuming that
there is a bubble and that it will burst. Regardless of which alternative is chosen,
our conclusion is the result of a simple assumption rather than rigorous analysis.
Real-time data. Bernhardsen et al. (2004, pp. 21–27) discuss problems associ-
ated with revisions to data when performing real-time analysis. The salient point
is that recent observations are uncertain and often revised significantly at later
points in time. This problem is accentuated when using the HP filter in real time
by giving the most recent observations additional weight through the end-point
problem. Prognosticating future values is a possible way out here too, though the
perils of prognosis remain.
Long business cycles and trends. If a deviation from trend persists over a
long time, the HP filter’s “aversion to change in trends” – the second term in
equation 3.6 – will be given relatively little weight. For normal values of λ the
deviation from trend will be modeled as a change in trend. When attempting to
discover bubbles, this implies that a bubble that has built up over a long time
period will not be shown. The HP filter will give us yet another reason to believe
4There are, however, extensive mathematical descriptions of how λ values can be chosen to
fit a time series – se e.g. Schlicht (2004).
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that “this time is different” (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) rather than revealing the
bubble.
Asymmetry in booms and busts. In the first term of the HP filter,
∑T
t=1(yt−
τt)
2, positive and negative deviations from trend are given the same weight. It is
therefore implicitly assumed that periods above the trend are as long as those
below the trend. This need not be the case – for example, Romer (1999) explains
how booms are generally longer than recessions.
Conclusion. In sum, the HP filter has a series of problems, and using it to
discover bubbles is extremely difficult. Any analysis will be based on a large
set of assumptions, and making these assumptions will often involve tilting the
conclusion.
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Chapter 4
Growth and crisis – an
introduction
This chapter is divided in two parts. First, economic developments in Norway over
the last decade are presented. I then give a short introduction to the international
aspects of the 2008 financial crisis, providing a context for analyzing domestic
issues.
4.1 A decade of growth and low inflation
Economic growth in Norway was high in the period leading up to the crash in 2008,
as shown in figure 4.1. This growth partially reflected a period of high growth in
the world economy and was strengthened by high oil prices and subsequent high
export revenues, shown in figure 4.2.
Norwegian inflation was remarkably low and stable during this period of high
economic growth. The CPIXE, as shown in figure 4.3, does not indicate any ma-
jor inflationary pressure which Keynesian economics postulates for boom periods.
Until the end of 2007, the inflation was well below the target, hovering for a long
period between 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent.
Interest rates, shown in figure 4.4, were relatively low most of the period.
However, an upward adjustment beginning in July 2005 peaked at 5.75 percent
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in June 2008 and tightened economic policy slightly as the bubble developed. In
other words, the central bank did use monetary policy to alleviate some of the
pressures in the economy, the remaining question is whether this was sufficient
and whether the timing was right.
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Figure 4.1: Norwegian GDP, 2000-2009. NOK per capita. Source: Statistics
Norway.
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Figure 4.2: Brent dated oil price, 2000-2009. USD per barrel. Source: ICE.
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Figure 4.3: CPIXE and inflation target. Source: Statistics Norway.
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Figure 4.4: Norwegian deposit rate, 1991-2009. Source: Norges Bank.
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These simple graphs portray a success story, a decade with high growth and
low inflation. The decline in GDP in the current recession has been mild and
inflation has been low throughout the period. It is important to both acknowledge
the successes of the period and investigate complexities hidden by these simple
figures when studying monetary policy in this period. I will attempt to address
two questions in particular. Firstly, has the pressure in the economy been higher
than that suggested by the CPI? Secondly, has this deviation contributed to a
bubble?
4.2 An introduction to the 2008 financial crisis
A series of problems showed up in the U.S. housing market in August 2007. Amer-
ican Home Mortgage, a large provider of home loans, filed for bankruptcy on
August 6. It had made significant losses in the subprime market – a part of the
U.S. housing market where borrowers generally have few assets and low incomes.
On August 9, the French bank BNP Paribas suspended three of its investment
funds – again citing problems with the U.S. housing sector. This froze up the
short-term credit markets (Soros 2008, pp. xiii–xvii). These early problems in the
American housing markets were followed by similar collapses in other firms and
injections of liquidity to the financial markets by central banks.
Figure 4.5 shows the S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 20 Home Price Index
(SPCS20R) for the period January 2000–January 2010. This index shows a repeat-
sales index for 20 metropolitan areas in the U.S.1 The figure shows how a large
bubble had developed in the housing market, with prices peaking in august 2006.
Soros (2008, p. xv) outlines how these increasing prices led to both speculation
and increased consumption through “extraction” of home equity – in other words,
part of the rise in housing prices was consumed through refinancing. One of the
aspects of the current crisis is the unwinding of these bubbles.
1A repeat sales index involves measuring the change in value a single house is sold at different
points in time. This reduces some measurement problems – for example, a simple calculation of
average price in an area at a given point in time would be sensitive to the kind of homes that
have been sold recently.
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Figure 4.5: S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 20 Home Price Index. Source: S&P
(2010).
The initial problems in the U.S. housing markets were followed by many other
related setbacks. Securitization of mortgages through collateralized debt obliga-
tions was supposed to reduce risk through increased diversification. Soros (2008,
p. xvii) contends that “they increased the risks by transferring ownership of mort-
gages from bankers who knew their customers to investors who did not.”
The market for credit default swaps (CDS) had provided the rationale for this
diversification. When one could be insured against failing CDOs, knowing the
borrower was no longer necessary and risk could be taken by those best able to
bear them. This failed miserably, with huge amounts of risks concentrated in some
actors, requiring the insurance giant AIG to be bailed out to avoid a complete
financial meltdown (Guerrera, van Duyn and Guha 2008).
GDP development from 2000-2009 for a few developed countries is shown in
figure 4.6. There is a significant fall in output for all countries, though some have
experienced significantly steeper falls than others.2
2Germany and Japan have large sectors producing long-lived assets. Since these sectors are
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Figure 4.6: GDP in fixed prices 2000–2009, 2000 = 1. Source: IMF (2010).
Figure 4.7 shows the unemployment rate in the same set of countries for the
period 2000–2009. The variation between countries is much larger here – partially
because they started at very different levels, partially because the impact has
differed between countries. All countries have had some increase. The increase
was highest in the UK and US – this is likely to be a consequence of flexible
labour markets as much as how hard the economies have been hit.
Figure 4.8 shows world merchandize export volumes for the period 1981–2009.
The fall in global trade volumes resulting from the financial crisis of 2008 was
dramatic with nothing like it occurring in the past decades. This decline was still
much lower than in the 1929–1933 depression when approximately 2/3 of world
trade vanished (Kindleberger 1986, p. 171).
The difference between three-month money market rates and expected official
interest rate for the U.S. and Norway is shown in figure 4.9. The freeze in credit
highly sensitive to the business cycle, the rapid GDP decline in these countries might be a result
of such sensitivty rather than offering any information on the bounce-back effect. See e.g. Wynne
and Balke (1993) for an analysis of this effect.
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Figure 4.7: International unemployment rates. Source: IMF (2010).
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Figure 4.8: World merchandise export volume, change from previous year. Source:
WTO (2010).
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markets following the bankruptcy of American Home Mortgage can be seen in
August 2007, the huge spike in the autumn of 2008 came after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and the rescue of AIG.
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Figure 4.9: Difference between three-month money market rate and expected bank
rate. Source: Norges Bank (2010).
Money markets have now returned to more normal levels, unemployment rates
in some countries seem to have peaked and the U.S. housing market – the collapse
of which signaled the start of the crisis – has stopped falling. The output loss
has been significant, and while a new depression seems to have been avoided, it is
evident that the great moderation (Bernanke 2004) was not so great.
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Chapter 5
Did inflation targeting contribute
to the current financial crisis?
The previous chapters introduced the theories of inflation targeting and financial
crises, and introduced recent macroeconomic developments. The aim of this chap-
ter is to use the background from the previous chapters to answer the central
question of this thesis: did the Norwegian inflation targeting policy contribute to
the current financial crisis?
Because no single model or theory will suffice in explaining a complex phe-
nomenon, many approaches have been presented in the preceding chapters. This
chapter reflects that view – many different macroeconomic indicators are assessed,
and theories are used where they provide plausible explanations.
5.1 The housing market
Housing prices have increased dramatically in Norway since the crash in the early
1990s. Housing prices declined somewhat as part of the financial crisis, but this
decline has now turned into a moderate growth in prices. Figure 5.1 shows the
development from January 1990 to March 2010.
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Figure 5.1: Housing prices in Norway, thousand NOK per square metre. Source:
Econ.
Rental and owner-occupied homes in the price index
Because rent is used to measure housing costs in the price index, large increases
in housing prices have not led to high inflation. Figure 5.2 shows the development
of home and rental prices and gives an idea of the size of the deviation.
There are valid arguments for using rent as a proxy for housing costs (see
section 2.2), but problems occur if significant deviations between the two persist
over time. The current home price level is relevant only for those who have bought
homes recently or are about to buy. However, since the prices have been diverging
for an extended period of time, a large part of the cost of housing for Norwegian
consumers is not reflected in the price index. Such persistent deviations give
misleading signals when inflation is used as an indicator of pressure in the economy.
Constructing an alternative price index. Finding a difference between rental
cost and sales prices is interesting in itself though it would be more useful if the
effect was quantified. Figure 5.3 is an attempt at illustrating the size of the prob-
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Figure 5.2: Normalized housing prices in Norway and housing component in CPI.
January 1990 = 1. Source: Econ and Statistics Norway.
lem. The figure shows two price indices – the standard price index using imputed
rents and a new index constructed by replacing the imputed rent index with the
Econ home price index.
Figure 5.3 clearly shows that the disparity between imputed rent and home
prices make a significant difference in the price index. The difference seems to be
larger in the 2000s than in the 1990s. This is partially the result of the housing
crash in the early 1990s, but also reflects a statistical technicality that might not be
as representative of economic realities. Statistics Norway changed the classification
of consumption in 1999. This changed the weights applied to goods and services
in the price index significantly. For example, the weight given to imputed rent was
doubled between July and August 1999. The new index is consequently likely to
underestimate the effect of including home prices for the 1990s.
Table 5.1 shows historical inflation figures using both imputed rent and home
prices. Arithmetic average inflation is changed from 2.65% to 3.72% over the
period January 1990–March 2010. Inflation from January 2000–March 2010 is
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Figure 5.3: Inflation with prices and imputed rent. Sources: Statistics Norway,
Econ.
increased from 2.86% to 4.24%. This suggests that the cost of living has increased
at a pace significantly different from the price index.
The new index only replaces the imputed rents for owner-occupied homes, the
rents paid are still included with weight corresponding to their share of consump-
tion. The imputed rent index is based on the same rental market survey as the
paid rent index. Statistics Norway does some very minor adjustments to the im-
puted rent index, but the correlation between the imputed and paid rents remain
at above 99.8% after these adjustments. As a result, different rates of quality
improvement in owner-occupied homes and rented homes are not reflected in the
imputed index.
Adjusting for different rates of quality improvements. Increasing home
prices is not only the result of higher prices for a given type of property, it also
reflects quality improvements. Those renting their dwellings are generally young,
low-income households. If quality improvements are a normal good – as seems
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Table 5.1: Average inflation, using official values, Econ prices and deflated Econ
prices. Sources: Statistics Norway, Econ.
Inflation Adjusted inflation Adjusted inflation with discounting
1990-2010 2.65% 3.72% 3.04%
1990-1999 2.07% 2.25% 2.11%
2000-2010 2.86% 4.24% 3.36%
reasonable – the quality improvements over time are likely to be larger for owner-
occupied homes.
It is necessary to construct another price index to adjust for this deviation. In
this index, the Econ home price index is discounted by 2% per year.1 This index
is shown in figure 5.4.
The discounting does of course reduce the deviation between the two indices,
though a difference remains. It is worth noting that applying the 2% discount to
the whole period might cause an underestimation of the deviation, as homes are
not upgraded at a constant rate. The weight applied to maintenance and upgrade
of homes has increased over time and current levels are very high compared to the
early 1990s.
Testing for significance. Table 5.1 shows the average inflation for different
period using the different price indices. Using the undiscounted home price series
causes a major increase in inflation for all periods, the change is less dominating
with the discounted series.
I have performed a simple regression analysis to evalute the statistical signifi-
1This figure might seem to be chosen rather randomly. It is definitely not a highly precise
measure, but should hopefully not be completely out of line with reality. Maintenance and
upgrade of homes and cabins make up around 6% of Norwegian consumption. Some maintenance
is needed to keep the quality constant, and there has been some increase in the quality of rental
homes. If a crude assumption of equal weights to these factors is made, we are left with a
discounting factor of 2%.
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Figure 5.4: Inflation with discounted prices and imputed rent. Source: Econ,
Statistics Norway.
cance of these results. The two new indices PEcont and P
EconDisc
t are first discounted
by the consumer price index.
xk,t =
P kt
CPIt
with k = Econ and EconDisc (5.1)
I then regress the discounted index with time as the independent variable.
xk,t = β0 + β1t+ t (5.2)
A positive coefficient for time, β1, implies that the new index has grown signif-
icantly faster than the old.
Table 5.2 shows the regression results for the adjusted inflation index. The
deviation from the consumer price index is clearly positive, with a t value of 39.44
and an annual deviation being around 1%. Table 5.3 shows results for the series
additionally discounted by 2% each year. The conclusion is similar though the
magnitude of the difference has obviously been decreased. The t value of 30.21 is
still very high, the annual deviation is around 0.5% and the deviations are clearly
significant.
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Table 5.2: Regression analysis, adjusted inflation discounted by regular inflation.
Coef. Std. Err. t P >| t | [95% Conf. Interval]
Time .0107 .000271 39.44 0.000 .0102 .0112
Constant .935 .00377 247.74 0.000 .927 .942
Table 5.3: Regression analysis, adjusted inflation discounted by regular inflation
and 2% p.a.
Coef. Std. Err. t P >| t | [95% Conf. Interval]
Time .00515 .000170 30.21 0.000 .00481 .00549
Constant .955 .00237 403.01 0.000 .951 .960
Hidden pressures in the housing market. Section 2.3 described how a cred-
ible inflation targeting regime can lead to financial instability through hindering
pressures from showing up as higher prices.
It can be argued that such pressures showed up in the Norwegian housing
market. A large rise in credit-financed housing investment caused a speculative
frenzy resulting in a macroeconomic bubble that echoed the classic description of
Kindleberger and Minsky.
Because inflation was low, the central bank followed an expansionary monetary
policy. The bubble did not show up in the form of inflation because asset prices
are not included in the price index. This allowed the central bank to maintain its
low interest rates, causing further monetary expansion.
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Is there a housing bubble in Norway?
One interesting aspect of the development in housing prices is the occurrence of a
bubble. The adjustment costs associated with a bubble in the housing markets are
large. Hence, it would probably not be courageous to suggest that even though it
is not a direct target for the central bank. Avoiding housing bubbles is a central
component in ensuring financial stability, which is clearly part of the central bank’s
mandate.
No one is seriously suggesting that central banks should target a particular level
of home prices. The key question is whether central banks should “lean against the
wind” by tightening monetary policy when asset prices grow rapidly. The aim of
this section is to evaluate whether there is a bubble in Norwegian home prices, and
consequently, whether the central bank ought to have followed a tighter monetary
policy.
In section 3.1, we derived a formal theory of bubbles – the difference between
the market price of an asset and the net present value of its future payments to the
holder. Calculating this difference is a straight forward task, making assumptions
that accurately reflect economic realities is not so simple.
This lack of certainty limits the gains from using any single statistical test or
model to discover bubbles. An alternative approach is to consider a multitude
of factors and gain an understanding through the sum of information from these
factors. The danger in this is that conclusions are likely to differ between factors
and the “this time is different” problem remains – it will always be possible to find
some cogent reason for excluding or including one strand of analysis.
To get a sense of the size of the Norwegian price growth in the recent years, it
is worth comparing it to that in other countries. Figure 5.5 shows the Econ price
index and the S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 10 Home Price Index from January
1990–January 2010. One striking conclusion from the graph is that the increase
in price was similar, but Norway has not yet experienced a major correction.
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Figure 5.5: Housing prices in Norway and the U.S. (rebased to Norwegian). Source:
Econ, S&P (2010).
Equilibrium in the housing market
Consumers have the choice between buying and renting their homes. One way
of measuring the existence of a bubble would therefore be to analyze whether
consumers are indifferent between these two substitutes. If this is not the case,
one of the markets – or both – is not in equilibrium.
A simple way of measuring whether consumers are indifferent between renting
and buying homes is calculating the relationship between prices P and rent R – the
P/R coefficient. Figure 5.6 shows such a coefficient time series for Norway from
1970-2009. The figures are calculated from a combination of statistics. Rental
prices are from Statistics Norway. The housing price series has been spliced from
two data sets – figures from 1970-1989 are from Norges Bank’s Historical Monetary
Statistics project, while figures from 1990-2009 are from Econ.
The housing bubble in the late 1980s shows very clearly in figure 5.6, the
coefficient rose significantly in that period. If increase in recent years should be
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Figure 5.6: P/R coefficients for Norway, 1970-2009. Sources: Statistics Norway,
Econ and Norges Bank.
interpreted in a similar way, we obviously have a large bubble in the Norwegian
housing market.
Imbalances in the rental market. Finding a deviation between the market
for rental and owner-occupied homes does not necessarily imply that there exists
a bubble. After all, the imbalance may be in the rental market.
Rental markets have been highly regulated in Norway. Much of this regulation
has been dismantled, but there are still limits defining how much a landlord can
increase the rent when a contract is running. This regulation and the differences
between rental and owner-occupied homes could explain some of the deviation
between the two series over time.
However, with most regulation dismantled and the effects of discounting for
quality differences shown to be marginal in section 5.1, there is nothing in these
arguments that can explain the rapid rise of price-to-rent ratios since the early
1990s. We cannot expect the markets to move in parallel, but neither can we
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explain a complete separation.
Credit-financed bubble. The expansion of credit is a critical factor in ex-
plaining financial crises. In this context, it is interesting to note that those renting
homes are largely detached from the credit markets whilst those buying homes
are critically dependent on access to credit. An intriguing way of looking at the
two markets is to imagine housing as a uniform good where the rental market
is disconnected from credit markets and the market for owning homes is closely
connected to credit markets. Changes in the price-to-rent ratio should then be a
pure reflection of changes in the effect of being connected to the credit market.
This “pure reflection” is obviously not an accurate description of the realities of
the housing market. It does however represent a valuable framework for analyzing
differences between the two markets. There will always be some deviation between
the markets because of different housing types, gradual improvements made by
homeowners and friction in the market. After these factors have been accounted
for and there remains a large difference, the credit market is likely to be central
in explaining the residual change in the P/R coefficient. This mode of thought
indicates that we now have a large, credit-based housing bubble in Norway.
The trend in the Norwegian housing market
Figure 5.7 shows prices in the Norwegian housing market from 1970-20092 and two
HP-filtered trends, using λ values of 100 and 2500. In figure 5.8, the deviation
between the trend using λ = 2500 and the price series is shown. It is clear that
changes have occurred over time and one could perhaps suggest that the figure
shows two periods with bubbles – a recent episode in addition to the bubble in the
mid 1980s.
However, most of the recent bubble seems to have vanished by a fairly marginal
fall in prices according to figure 5.8. This might simply reflect the limitations
of the HP filter described in section 3.4. The end-point problem is particularly
2Only annual values are included here, to simplify the process of HP-filtering – in previous
calculations, figures were used at the maximum granularity available.
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problematic here, with the trend changing to accommodate whatever movement
happens in the recent periods.
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Figure 5.7: Housing prices in Norway, NOK per square metre and HP-filtered
trends with λ = 100 and 2500. Source: Econ, Norges Bank.
Evaluating the choice of λ. Figure 5.9 shows the deviation between home
prices and HP-filtered trends using λ = 100, 2500 and 10000. The aim of this is
to illustrate the sensitivity of our conclusion to the choice of λ. All three values
seem to capture the boom in the 1980s fairly well. There are larger differences in
how the series portray the subsequent crash.
Establishing which of the series best portrays economic realities involves a
degree of judgement – when was the market really in equilibrium and how large
was the negative bubble? If we crudely assume that the market was in equilibrium
halfway between the peak and trough, implying that January 1990 represents
the equilibrium in my sample. From January 1990 to January 1993, market prices
declined by 790NOK per square metre and it had at this point declined by 751NOK
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Figure 5.8: Housing prices − HP-filtered trend, λ = 2500. Source: Econ, Norges
Bank.
per square metre from the peak in January 1987.3 From this, it looks as if the
“standard” λ value of 100 captures the essence of the crash fairly well.
Even if the HP filter with a λ of 100 captured the previous housing bubble well,
this does not imply that it performs well in real-time. Lower λ values increases
the sensitivity of the filter to the end-point problem.
There are two conclusions from this analysis. Firstly, results are prone to be
spurious because of limitations from the HP filter. Secondly, if current price levels
are in line with fundamentals a rapid trend growth is implied. Is such a growth
plausible?
A rational growth path? Grytten (2009) investigates the rationality of the
price growth based on three factors – cost of building, moderate growth in an
international perspective and improved standard of living. He finds that the costs
of building have increased significantly, but not enough to justify current price
3Using monthly data leads to a marginal change in the figures and dating of peak and trough.
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Figure 5.9: Housing prices − HP-filtered trend, λ = 100, 2500 and 10000. Source:
Econ, Norges Bank.
levels. Norwegian price growth has been fairly high compared to that in other
countries. Disposable income has increased around 80 percent from 1995-2007
whilst real home prices increased by 230 percent.
Housing prices increasing more rapidly than disposable income is not necessar-
ily an argument in itself for the existence of a bubble. As real disposable income
increases, the proportion of income spent on necessities such as food and cloth-
ing may decrease and the proportion available to spend on housing increases. An
interpretation is that the increase in disposable income could support part of the
price growth, but a very large part of the increased disposable income would have
to be spent on housing if all the price increase should be explained by increased
disposable income.
Norges Bank’s model for home prices. Jacobsen and Naug (2004) describe a
model used by Norges Bank to analyze home prices. The model is specified on the
basis of macroeconomic data from 1990–2004. It uses indicators such as nominal
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interest rates, unemployment and nominal wages to estimate both a short-term
and long-term equilibrium. The estimated model confirms intuition – nominal
interest rates have a large and swift effect on prices and rising unemployment
leads to falling prices.
This model finds that current market prices are reasonably well in line with
fundamentals, see e.g. OECD (2010, pp. 69–72). Conclusions from the model are
necessarily based on an assumption that the period from 1990–2004 is represen-
tative of longer-term developments. This is essentially the same conundrum we
ended up with when using the HP filter. If price growth over the last cycle is in
line with fundamentals the model is likely to be correct. However, if fundamentals
cannot explain the price growth the model’s conclusions are not correct in the
longer term.
The model has established a very clear link between short-term changes in
nominal interest rates, wages and home prices – but it is impossible to establish
whether this link is fundamentally sound in the long-term or another case of elusive
stability.
Conclusion
It is impossible to reach any definite conclusion regarding the existence of a housing
market bubble in Norway. Depending on the approach used, one might conclude
that the market is either roughly in line with fundamentals or that prices are much
higher than can be rationally supported in the long term.
Significantly higher unemployment rates or interest rates could cause a collapse
in the housing market. With the rapid increase in prices since the 1993 trough,
consumers have a large part of their financial assets in the form of housing. A
significant part of this is credit financed.
The rapid, credit-financed increase in house prices makes households vulner-
able to economic shocks and a winding down of debt and house prices could be
extremely costly. This indicates that the central bank should have “leaned against
the wind” by increasing the interest rates when prices were spiraling upwards.
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5.2 Stock market bubble
The stock market experienced a significant boom in the years preceding the current
financial crisis. The main index on the Oslo Stock Exchange rose to 524.37 in July
2007 from a low of 98.57 in February 2003. Conditions could hardly have been
more euphoric. A fairly limited decline in the second half of 2007 was replaced by
a rapid increase starting in early 2008 in prices that lasted until May 2008. The
price development of the OSEBX index from 2000-2009 is shown in figure 5.10.4
In the middle of 2008, market values declined rapidly – following both a collapse
in international stock markets and the oil price. Panic was widespread and the
index fell from over 500 to less than 200 in about 7 months.
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Figure 5.10: OSEBX Index and deposit rate January 2000–March 2010. Sources:
NHH Exchange Project and Yahoo Finance.
This period of stock market ecstasy provided another signal of pressure and
optimism in the economy. Should this have called the central bank to action,
4Figures from 2000–2004 are from the NHH Exchange Project (Børsprosjektet ved NHH),
figures from 2005–2010 are from Yahoo Finance
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tightening monetary policy?
Using asset prices as an input in monetary policy decisions is controversial.
Akram, Bardsen and Eitrheim (2006) develop an econometric model of the Nor-
wegian economy to analyze the problem. They find that including housing and
equity prices can improve financial stability.
Bernanke and Gertler (2000) examine the same problem and find that asset
prices should be taken into account only to the extent that they signal inflationary
or deflationary pressures.
Conclusions in the literature are ambiguous and developing, what would be
the most appropriate response for Norway? One potential argument for taking
asset prices into account is the importance of oil and investments in the oil sector.
Pressures in this sector do not show up as inflation directly, but bubbles in the oil
sector can cause large problems.
A high oil price increases demand for goods and services in the oil industry
and its suppliers. Government revenues are also highly dependent on oil prices,
as shown in figure 5.11. The producer price index for oil and gas production in
Norway has risen rapidly in recent years, as shown in figure 5.12. The Norwegian
stock market is highly correlated with oil prices, see figure 5.13.
The combination of a stock market highly correlated with oil prices and a
real economy heavily depending on oil prices indicates that signals from the stock
market may be particularly relevant for Norwegian monetary policy.
As can clearly be seen from figure 5.10, monetary policy was counter-cyclical5
in one sense – the deposit rate tended to be increased when stock prices increased
and vice versa.
A marginal tightening of policy does not indicate that monetary policy was
tight when measured on an absolute level. The average deposit rate from 2004-2006
was 2.16 per cent. This seems remarkably low compared to an average nominal
deposit rate of 5 per cent from 1991–2009 (Norges Bank 2010a). The central bank
considers 4.5–5.5 per cent a “normal level” (Bernhardsen 2010). Interest rates
5Peaks and troughs in the business cycle are obviously not dated purely by stock exchange
movements; this is a case of correlation, not causality.
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Figure 5.11: Brent price (USD) and government net cash flow from activities in
the petroleum sector (billion NOK). Source: ICE and the Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate (2009).
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Figure 5.12: Producer price index for Norwegian oil and natural gas production.
Source: Statistics Norway.
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Figure 5.13: Brent price (USD) 2000-2009 and OSEBX. Source: ICE and OSE.
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were increased from 2005 to limit pressure in the economy, but this was too little,
too late. From a mathematical perspective, the sign of the first derivative was
correct, but the absolute level too low.
5.3 Cheap imports, expensive exports
Most oil and natural gas production in Norway is exported and the prices of
these commodities are included in the price index according to their weights in
consumption. There is nothing dramatic in a single sector having a different weight
in the economy than in the average consumer’s purchases – this is to be expected
in an open economy.
If sectors given little weight in the inflation measure are important to the econ-
omy and the development in this sector differs from the average sector, pressure
in the economy is unlikely to show up as inflation. Similarly, prices of imported
goods are important for the level of inflation, but say little about the capacity
utilization of the domestic economy.
Figure 5.14 shows prices of export and imports from 2000-2009. As expected,
export prices have increased significantly and this increase correlates well with the
rise in oil and natural gas prices.
Many consumer goods, such as clothing and electronics, are to a large extent
imported. The inclusion of China and other developing Asian economies in the
world economy has caused a outward shift in labour supply. Together with im-
provements in technology this has reduced the costs of producing many consumer
goods. This displacement has led to a very modest growth of import prices in
recent years.
The relationship between export and import prices – terms of trade – is shown
in figure 5.15. This increase is yet another signal of deviation between the measure
of inflation and pressure in the economy. Arguments for tightening monetary policy
could be countered by measuring the level of consumer price inflation – ignoring
that prices of goods produced in Norway rose rapidly. This could have concealed
a large, positive output gap.
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Figure 5.14: Normalized export and import prices for Norway, 2000–2009. January
2000 = 100. Source: Statistics Norway.
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Figure 5.15: Terms of trade. January 2000 = 1. Source: Statistics Norway.
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5.4 Nominal wages
Section 2.3 introduced a method used by Mankiw and Reis (2003) to produce
a stability price index. One of the most interesting conclusions from this study
is that including nominal wages in the price index would significantly improve
macroeconomic stability.
There are two main questions relevant to this thesis that arise from Mankiw
and Reis (2003). First, given the model from Mankiw and Reis (2003), has the
development in nominal wages in Norway indicated that monetary policy should
have been tighter? Secondly, do nominal wages provide the same information in
Norway as they do in the U.S.? In other words, is the link between nominal wages
and the business cycle different?
Norwegian nominal wage development
Figure 5.16 shows the annual change in nominal wages for Norway in the period
1996–2009. If a stability price index with the weights from Mankiw and Reis (2003)
was introduced, then wages increasing faster than trend growth should trigger a
tightening of monetary policy.
The data mean seems to be relatively stable although growth was fairly high in
real terms and there are some large variations around the mean. These variations
are likely to be partly caused by seasonality in the data. The conclusion from this
simple analysis is that wages did not change at a pace that should have triggered
a major tightening of monetary policy.
Do Norwegian wages contain the same information as U.S. wages?
Mankiw and Reis (2003) specify their model with data and assumptions based on
the U.S. economy. Should we expect conclusions about the link between the U.S.
labour market and business cycles to hold for Norway? Nominal wages provide
value in inflation targeting because they include information about the expecta-
tions of millions of employers and employees; all these expectations are aggregated
into the average change in the nominal wage level.
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Figure 5.16: Norwegian nominal wages, per cent change from previous year.
Q11996-Q3 2009 Source: Statistics Norway.
Frøland (1997) describes the history and functioning of the Norwegian wage
negotiation system. The salient point is that wages are determined within a corpo-
rative framework. Large trade unions and employer organizations conduct central-
ized wage negotiations and the result from these negotiations determined the wage
level for most Norwegian employees. The government takes part both through its
role as a major employer and through promising policy changes in order to affect
the outcome of the negotiations.
These centralized processes are likely to cause distortions different from those
in a decentralized system. Centralized negotiations take into account the expec-
tations of large organizations and their leaders, not the expectations of millions
as in decentralized systems. Consequently, we cannot expect Norwegian wages to
provide the same information about the business cycle as U.S. wages do.
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5.5 Monetary and credit aggregates
Large and rapid increases in monetary and credit aggregates might be indicative
of bubble creation, as described in section 2.3 and Borio and Lowe (2002). This
section analyzes the development of these figures.
Domestic credit volume
The domestic gross credit volume from 1987-2009 is shown in figure 5.17. A slight
peak is shown around 1990-1991 when the last bubble burst. The credit volume
started growing again after a decline that lasted until the end of 1993. The pace
of the increase increased significantly in 1997 and it seems as if credit volumes
exploded in 2005.
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Figure 5.17: Total Norwegian domestic gross credit, 1987-2009, billion NOK.
Source: Statistics Norway.
Nominal credit volumes are now 3.9 times higher than in november 1993. Nom-
inal GDP has grown by a factor of 2.8 in the same period. The figure consequently
looks more dramatic than it probably is. After adjusting for economic growth, the
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increase in credit volume is not that extreme. Figure 5.18 shows the same credit
volume series, discounted by nominal GDP and rebased. From this perspective,
the credit growth is not as massive in the previous figure, but the increase has
been fairly steep even when taking economic growth into account.
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Figure 5.18: Total Norwegian credit volumes discounted by GDP. January 1987 =
1 Source: Statistics Norway.
It can be argued that the early 1990s was an exceptionally bad period in the
Norwegian economy and an increase in gearing from that period is not necessarily a
problem. If investments are considered more risky than they actually are in periods
of crises as suggested by Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), part of the increase could
simply reflect more realistic assessments.
Financial innovations probably have some role in the increased credit volumes.
An example is homeowner extraction of home equity to finance consumption. This
may increase the equilibrium level of indebtedness in households; where mortgages
used to only be a way of financing home purchases for the fairly young, it has also
become a way of increasing consumption for the elderly. Whether these financial
innovations are permanent shifts in credit markets or yet another case of “this
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time is different” remains to be seen.
Monetary aggregates
Figure 5.19 shows the seasonally adjusted6 monthly growth in money supply M2
and HP-filtered trend from 1997-2009. The standard λ value of 14400 for monthly
data is used.
The money stock grew from 2003 to early 2007, before it started a fairly swift
decline lasting to early 2008. The growth until 2007 might reflect the generally
upbeat economic conditions, and the decline fits well with the early stages of the
current crisis – though the HP filter performs poorly here because of the end-point
problem. The fact that the money stock did not collapse when equity markets and
investor confidence did in late 2008 is likely a result of the massive rescue packages
provided by governments.
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Figure 5.19: Seasonally adjusted Norwegian monthly M2 growth and HP-filtered
growth with λ = 14400. Source: Statistics Norway.
6The figures are seasonally adjusted by Statistics Norway, using the X12-ARIMA system from
the U.S. Census Bureau.
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The credit volume has grown significantly, but the development does not seem
all that explosive when growth in GDP is taken into account. The money stock
grew during the boom period and started falling in early 2007. Both of these time
series show signs of the boom and subsequent bust, but there is little indication
in this that the central bank should have acted otherwise.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Inflation targeting was formally adopted in Norway in 2001. The period since has
been one of high economic growth and low inflation. High commodity prices have
led to high price growth for Norway’s export goods, prices of import goods have
grown little.
The informational value of the consumer price inflation has been distorted by
three principal factors – home prices, a stock market bubble and the difference
between export and import goods. Credit market expansion provided another
signal of market pressures.
Housing prices have increased rapidly and this has not been reflected in inflation
figures. This has over time led to a large deviation between the costs of housing
and the costs indicated by the consumer price index.
The housing prices in Norway have not declined much from their peak and
are currently on the rise again, whilst other countries have experienced significant
declines. Establishing with certainty whether this is because of fundamental factors
or a bubble is close to impossible. The development of the relationship between
costs of renting and purchasing accommodation suggests that the housing market is
not in equilibrium. Prices have exploded whilst rental costs have grown modestly.
A large bubble in the stock market was a further indication of the euphoria in
the economy. Few are suggesting that central banks should include asset prices
as a direct target for monetary policy, though one could argue that central banks
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should lean against the wind; cleaning up after major bubbles is a costly exercise.
Prices for goods that have been imported have risen very modestly over the
past decade whilst prices for export goods have increased significantly. This has
contributed to distorting the signals provided by the CPI, cheap consumer goods
imported from Asia have kept inflation low.
In total, these three factors have led to a situation where the central bank acted
as if the pressure was lower than it really was – and through this failed to take the
necessary steps to limit the size of the bubble in the economy.
The policy rate was increased somewhat during the period of euphoria, but
the levels were still very low in a period of high economic growth. Though we
have been able to avoid a major meltdown of the Norwegian economy, high levels
of debt and a housing market bubble have made households vulnerable to new
shocks. This vulnerability could have been reduced if a tighter monetary policy
had been pursued.
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